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I. INTRODUCTION
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,' the Supreme Court faced the difficult question of whether a morato-
rium that temporarily deprived landowners of all use of their property effected
a taking under the categorical Lucas rule. Ten years earlier, in a 1992
landmark decision, petitioner Lucas convinced the Supreme Court that the
Beachfront Management Act amounted to a taking because the Act prohibited
all construction on his beachfront property. 2 Ten years later, and leaning heav-
ily upon the Lucas holding, hundreds of Lake Tahoe Basin landowners peti-
tioned the Court for a similar holding in their case.3 Like Lucas, the Tahoe
petitioners wanted to build a house in the vicinity of a body of water; and like
Lucas, they were barred from developing their property due to regulations
aimed at preventing erosion and preserving nature.4 Whereas Lucas was pro-
hibited from developing his property for a period of two years,5 the ban
imposed on the Tahoe petitioners had already lasted close to three years. 6
Despite the strong similarities between the two cases, the Tahoe-Sierra
Court held that a moratorium on development imposed during the process of
formulating a comprehensive land-use plan did not constitute a per se taking of
property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause.7 Unlike Lucas, the
Tahoe petitioners were merely temporarily barred from developing their prop-
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1 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
2 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020 (1992).
3 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320-
21 (2002).
4 Id. at 312.
5 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 314.
7 Id. at 321.
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erty. s The Tahoe-Sierra Court did not foreclose the possibility of a temporary
taking, but held that temporary taking claims are to be decided under the Penn
Central analysis, which consists of balancing a number of factors.9
This note examines the consequences of the Tahoe-Sierra holding for
landowners who wish to challenge a temporary government regulation under a
temporary takings claim. Specifically, it addresses whether the distinction
made by the Tahoe-Sierra Court between temporary and permanent takings is
valid, and whether the Penn Central test provides sufficient protection for land-
owners hindered by a temporary regulation.
Part II of this note will give an overview of the historical development of
Takings jurisprudence and will attempt to reconcile the evolving progression in
the Court's decisions. Part III discusses the Tahoe-Sierra case in detail. Part
IV consists of an analysis of the holding in Tahoe-Sierra. Specifically, this
part begins by focusing on how the Supreme Court distinguished Tahoe-Sierra
from First English'° and Lucas, and how the Court added a new factor to the
Penn Central framework. This part continues by posing the question of
whether the distinction between temporary and (semi-) permanent regulations
warrants a separate Takings analysis, and whether the Penn Central analysis
adequately protects landowners who wish to attack temporary measures and
other delays in governmental decision-making under the Takings Clause. Part
V concludes by recognizing the difficulties that temporary takings pose, and the
need for a clarification and definition of all Penn Central factors in order to
protect landowners who claim a temporary taking.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states,
... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."'1 The Takings Clause is one of many provisions of the Constitution that
protects the right to private property.12 As one commentator noted, "[t]he pro-
tection of property ownership is a fundamental theme" in the Constitution. 3
The Takings Clause does not necessarily prohibit government from inter-
fering with property rights;' 4 rather, the purpose of the Clause is to ensure
compensation for the property owner when government takes property for pub-
lic use.' 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Takings
Clause was "designed to bar government from forcing some people alone to
8 Id. at 330-31.
9 Id. at 321, 338, 342.
10 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13 Kimberly Horsely, Comment, The Abnorrnalcy of Normal Delay, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 415,
415 (2001).
14 See First English, 482 U.S. at 314.
15 Id.
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bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."' 16
Three questions have dominated Takings jurisprudence. First, how should
"property" be defined? Does "property" merely refer to physical objects, or
does it refer to what an owner can do with this physical object?17 Or, has the
concept of property become so abstract that it now merely represents value?18
Second, when does government "take" property? Must the government
have taken title, or is possession enough? 9 Assuming that property consists of
a bundle of rights, has a taking occurred when the government takes one full
strand?20 What about a situation in which a government regulation reduces or
destroys all value in one's property interest without ever taking possession or
title?
Third, are "temporary" takings protected by the Takings Clause? Can a
government measure temporarily blocking all development on a piece of prop-
erty ever constitute a temporary taking?
These three questions and their sub-questions have not always been
answered in the same manner over the last hundred years. Times have
changed: intellectual property has its place next to physical property; the gov-
ernment plays a more active role due to industrialization, a more dense popula-
tion, and increasing traffic; people no longer have only one house, leading to
greater pollution and more need for government control. Although government
control is needed, the questions are how much and for how long can the gov-
ernment regulate before it is required to compensate?
B. Early Interpretations of the Takings Clause
In accord with the plain language of the Takings Clause, the Supreme
Court originally held that compensation was only due when the government
had physically taken private property. 2 ' A "taking" of property was viewed as
dispossession of the owner while at the same time taking over legal owner-
16 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
17 See generally William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); Courtney C. Tedrowe, Note,
Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 586 (2000);
Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence
of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988).
18 See Treanor, supra note 17, at 802 (contending that, according to Holmes, property is
value).
19 See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993) (discussing the historical
eminent domain power of the government).
20 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 57 (1985) (defending that each individual strand of the bundle of rights falls
within the scope of the Takings Clause); Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Prop-
erty: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676-78
(1988) (introducing the term "conceptual severance" and warning for a "slippery slope"
effect if every regulation affecting a strand of property amounts to a taking).
21 See, e.g., Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1870); Gibson v. United
States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897).
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ship.22 In short, landowners must have been deprived of all of the strands in
their bundle of rights: their right to use, exclude, and possess.23
In the Court's early interpretations of the Takings Clause, value was not
even considered as a strand in the bundle of rights. In Legal Tender Cases, the
Court specifically noted that government regulations, indirectly causing indi-
viduals to lose substantial value in their property, do not violate the Takings
Clause.24 The Court stressed that the Takings Clause only referred to "direct
appropriation," and reasoned that many other circumstances, such as a war,
may cause value in property to depreciate.25
Regulations aimed at stopping a public nuisance also did not constitute a
taking.26 Again, no title or transfer of possession had taken place; the govern-
ment would only stop a specific noxious use of the property, not all uses. Elimi-
nation of a noxious harm could not then, and cannot now, amount to a taking.27
According to some commentators, only this narrow interpretation, embedded in
the early Supreme Court jurisprudence, correctly reflects the original intent of
the Takings Clause.28 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court could not continue to
resist a movement urging an expansion of takings law. 29 Before the end of the
nineteenth century, the concept of property was about much more than physical
possession and title: the concept encompassed (resale) value together with the
owner's expectation at the time of purchase to maintain or increase its value.3°
C. Regulations Can Amount to Takings: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon31 abandoned the rule that government
regulations, no matter how harsh the results could be for the owner, do not
require compensation. Delivering the opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes
noted that property owners must expect that a valid exercise of police power
may diminish their property value, but that if regulations went "too far," they
could amount to a taking.32 While stating that a diminution of property value
22 Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 1088.
23 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (noting
that, in a case of physical appropriation, the right to use, possess, and exclude are all termi-
nated); see also Tedrowe, supra note 17, at 590-91 (discussing that property relates to
abstract rights an owner has vis-A-vis non-owners).
24 79 U.S. at 457, 551.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding a Kansas statute that
declared places where liquor was manufactured to be common nuisances); see also WILLIAM
A. FiSCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 22 (1995) (discussing that regulations aimed at stopping
a dangerous or noxious use do not require compensation).
27 See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a law that prohibited
the operation of a brickyard for interference with residential use of neighboring land); Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992).
28 See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 17, at 798 (noting that the clause was intended to protect
the liberal right of physical property ownership against unfair political process).
29 Treanor, supra note 17, at 800.
30 Id. at 799 (discussing Holmes' and Lewis' critique of the narrow view of property).
31 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
32 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
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was one of the factors to be considered by a court, Justice Holmes did not give
any clear guidelines as to how "far" regulations could go.
3 3
The Holmes rationale reflected the modem times: no longer was property
only about the right to use, exclude, and possess. Like stocks, people bought
property for investment purposes and expected its value to increase, or at least
remain constant. One strand in the bundle of rights became, maybe, the right to
make a profit or to keep the property profitable. At the same time, intellectual
property arose; property became a less physical and more abstract concept.34
The concept of property started to change.35
In the jurisprudence following Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court did
not succeed in setting forth a set of rules to determine when a regulatory taking
had occurred, instead evaluating regulations on a case-by-case basis. 36 Evident
to the Court, however, was that the purpose of the Takings Clause was to "bar
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."3 7 The ques-
tion remained: when exactly does "fairness and justice" demand compensation?
D. The Three Penn Central Factors
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,3 8 the Supreme
Court attempted to provide courts with a structure for determining when regula-
tions go "too far," thus amounting to a taking. The Court grouped together
three distinct factors it had used in earlier decisions.39
The first factor for courts to consider is the "economic impact of the regu-
lation on the claimant."4 This factor evaluates the effect of the regulation on
the value of the landowner's land. In a footnote, the Court implied that a regu-
lation denying landowners all economically viable use of their land would con-
stitute a compensable taking.4 '
The second factor directs courts to consider the "extent to which the regu-
lation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations" of the prop-
erty owner.4 2 The interpretation of this factor has changed over time.43 In
Penn Central, the Court implied that the current and originally intended use of
the land determined a landowner's investment-backed expectations.'a By con-
trast, Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States45 suggested that investment-
13 Id. at 413.
34 See Treanor, supra note 17, at 799 (discussing Lewis and Holmes).
31 See Radin, supra note 20, at 1670.
36 See, e.g., United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); United
States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
37 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
38 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
31 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 138 n.36 (this footnote became the holding in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980)).
42 Id. at 124.
43 See TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES § 1.5, at II (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2001) [here-
inafter TAKING SIDES].
44 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 136-37; TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 1.5, at 12.
45 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
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backed expectations relate to whether a landowner had "notice" of the govern-
ment regulation, or whether it was "foreseeable" that a regulation was forth-
coming.4 6 Recently, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,47 the Court held that
landowners who have notice of upcoming government regulations do not nec-
essarily lack investment-backed expectations. 48 Thus, the precise meaning and
scope of this factor is not entirely clear.49
The third and final Penn Central factor is the "character of the govern-
ment action."5 ° This factor, too, is not entirely clear.5 The Penn Central
Court suggested that courts must differentiate between physical appropriations
and regulations affecting the use of land; a taking will be found more "readily"
if the government physically appropriates land than when it regulates land for
the good of all.52 However, because all "permanent physical occupation[s]" of
land by the government are deemed takings,53 the question becomes what sig-
nificance the "character" factor still has as to regulatory takings.5 4
Despite the relative ambiguity of the last two factors, the Penn Central
Court emphasized that a diminution in value of property is only one of several
factors to consider in the analysis. Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected
an analysis that would divide a property interest into separate segments;
56
instead, courts should look at the effect of the regulation on the property as a
whole, and balance the three factors against each other.57
E. The Agins Test
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,5" the Supreme Court adopted yet another test
to determine whether a regulation effected a taking under the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Agins Court held that a taking is found if a regulation "does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or [if the regulation] denies
an owner economically viable use of his land."'59 Because the Supreme Court
offered these two prongs in the alternative, only one of the two has to be satis-
fied: a taking can be found if a perfectly valid government regulation neverthe-
less deprives an owner of economically viable use of the land.61
46 TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 2.1, at 25.
47 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
48 Id. at 627.
49 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.20, at 39 (4th ed. 1997).
50 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
51 TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 9.3(a), at 231.
52 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
53 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419 (1982);
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951).
54 TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 9.3(a), at 231.
55 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
56 Id. at 130; see also Radin, supra note 20, at 1676 (baptizing the division of a property
interest into separate segments; this is known as "conceptual severance").
51 See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104.
58 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
59 Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
60 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 17.2(a), at 403-04.
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The first prong of the new Agins test adds a flair of substantive Due Pro-
cess to the Takings jurisprudence.6 1 Indeed, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, too, requires that land regulations advance a legitimate
state interest and not be arbitrary.6 2 The second prong seems to combine one
or more Penn Central factors.63 A deprivation of "economically viable use"
could refer to the impact of the regulation on the owner as well as to reasonable
"investment backed expectations."'6 The Agins test would play a pivotal role
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.65
F. First English: Opening the Door for Temporary Takings
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
the Supreme Court was asked whether "temporary" regulatory takings are com-
pensable under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.66 After a severe
flood, the County of Los Angeles enacted an interim ordinance forbidding con-
struction in a flood protection area.6 7 The church, which lost its buildings as a
result of the flood and wanted to rebuild them, filed suit claiming that the ordi-
nance deprived it of all use of its land. 6' The church did not claim that the
ordinance was invalid, but instead asked for damages.
69
In adopting the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. San Diego,7" the Supreme Court held that "'temporary' takings
which ... deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind
from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensa-
tion."'" The First English Court went on to hold that "where the government's
activities have already worked a taking . . . no subsequent action" - such as an
amendment to, or an invalidation of the regulation - "can relieve it of the duty
to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effec-
tive."'72 However, the Supreme Court specifically noted that its holding did not
apply to "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordi-
nances, variances, and the like."7 3
In short, First English appeared to say: normal delays aside, the govern-
ment needs to compensate landowners who have lost all use of their property,
whether it concerns a temporary or permanent deprivation. Nevertheless, this
61 For substantive due process and takings jurisprudence, see MANDELKER, supra note 49, at
55; see also TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 17.2(a), at 403.
62 See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Vill. of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also TAKING SIDES, supra note 43,
§ 17.1(c), at 396-97.
63 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 17.2(a), at 403.
64 Id.
65 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See discussion infra Part I.G.
66 482 U.S. 304, 313 (1987).
67 Id. at 307.
68 Id. at 311.
69 Id.
70 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 318.
72 Id. at 321.
73 Id.
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interpretation of First English has been challenged, not only by many commen-
tators, but by the Supreme Court itself.7
4
G. The Categorical Lucas Rule
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided a case that led to the adoption of a
separate takings rule for cases in which a regulation has completely and perma-
nently deprived landowners of "all economically beneficial" use of their prop-
erty.75  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Beachfront
Management Act destroyed Lucas' hope to develop his beachfront property.76
Lucas admitted that the purpose of the regulation - preserving the beaches and
dunes from erosion - was a noble one, but that from his perspective the prop-
erty was rendered valueless.77 The Lucas Court held that when owners have
been deprived of all economically beneficial use of their property, they suffer a
total taking requiring compensation.78
Before Lucas, this categorical rule was reserved for physical takings: only
when the government physically took a piece of land, no matter how small, the
Court deemed the owner deprived of all beneficial use of that piece of land.7 9
The Lucas Court justified this new categorical rule for regulations by drawing
an analogy between regulations depriving property owners of all beneficial use
of their property and situations in which government had physically taken that
property.8s In these rare situations, property owners do not get any benefit in
return for giving up the restricted use set forth in the regulation.8" Or, in
"Pennsylvania Coal" terms, in these situations there is no "reciprocity of
advantage" for the landowner, as the landowner bears all the costs of preserv-
ing the coastal line, while not reaping any benefits of his landownership.82
However, the Court made an exception to this new rule. If a regulation
merely prohibits a use that has long been recognized as a common nuisance, the
owner cannot claim a taking occurred. 83 The Court further clarified that any-
thing less than a total taking was to be analyzed under a partial taking analysis,
as set forth in Penn Central.84 In other words, when a regulation has the effect
of taking ninety-five percent of beneficial use by the owner, the Lucas frame-
work does not apply: the per se rule is reserved for unusual cases in which a
regulation deprives an owner of all beneficial use of the property.85
71 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
75 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
76 Id. at 1008-09.
77 Id. at 1022.
78 Id. at 1019.
79 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982)
(holding that compensation is due when the government takes part of a rooftop to provide
cable TV for the tenants).
so Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
81 Id. at 1017-18.
82 Id. at 1018 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
83 Id. at 1029.
84 Id. at 1019-20 n.8.
85 Id.
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III. TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC. V. TAHOE REGIONAL
PLANNING AGENCY
In an effort to prevent erosion so as to preserve the exceptional clarity of
Lake Tahoe, the legislatures of Nevada and California adopted the Tahoe
Regional Planning Compact ("TRPC").8 6 TRPC, in turn, created the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA"). 8 7 TRPA was given the task of regulat-
ing development in the Tahoe Basin and, within eighteen months, adopting
standards for air quality, water quality, and soil conservation. Additionally, the
agency was to adopt a regional plan that would maintain those standards.88
Unable to establish the standards and a regional plan in time, TRPA
enacted Ordinance 81-5, which imposed a moratorium on development of new
construction in high hazard areas.8 9 By 1983, still unable to put a regional plan
in place, the agency adopted Ordinance 83-21, suspending all project approvals
until 1984.90 As a result, the two ordinances halted construction on sensitive
lands for thirty-two months in California, and for eight months in Nevada. 9
When TRPA finally enacted a regional plan in 1984, the State of Califor-
nia sought and obtained an injunction for its implementation, which remained
in effect until 1987.92 This added three more years to the thirty-two month
moratorium that had been imposed earlier. However, these three extra years
did not weigh in determining whether a temporary taking had occurred. 9 3 Con-
sequently, hundreds of petitioners hindered by the two moratoria filed suit in
federal court claiming they had been temporarily deprived of all economically
beneficial use of their property.94
In determining whether the two moratoria amounted to a taking, the Dis-
trict Court of Nevada evaluated the case both under the Penn Central analysis
and the categorical Lucas rule.95 Discussing the three Penn Central factors,
the court held that no partial taking had occurred. Specifically, the court held
that the moratoria did not interfere with petitioners' investment-backed expec-
tations, because the average holding time between lot purchases and home con-
struction was 25 years.96 Since petitioners' right to build had only been
delayed for a couple of years, it could not be said that their expectations of
constructing their homes earlier had been shattered.9 7 Under the Lucas total
taking analysis, however, the district court found that owners had been tempo-
86 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 308-09
(2002).
87 Id. at 309-10.
88 Id. at 310.
89 Id. at 311.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 312.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 313-14 ("Thus, we limit our discussion to the lower courts' disposition of the
claims based on the 2-year moratorium... and the ensuing 8-month moratorium... ").
94 Id. at 312.
9' See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1240-42 (D. Nev. 1999).
96 Id. at 1240.
97 Id. at 1241.
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rarily deprived of all economically viable use of their property and were enti-
tled to compensation.9 8
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. While the Ninth
Circuit recognized that, theoretically, a property interest could be divided into
several dimensions, the court refused to consider each dimension as a separate
property interest.99 Regulations affecting only one (temporal) dimension of an
owner's property interest do not deprive the owner of all beneficial use of prop-
erty.1 ° ° Therefore, the court held that the First English analysis did not apply,
and that the proper analysis was to look at the effect of the regulation on the
parcel as a whole under Penn Central.'° '
The Supreme Court affirmed. Delivering the opinion for the Court, Jus-
tice Stevens first discussed the distinction between physical and regulatory tak-
ings, noting that, because physical takings are more easily discernable than
regulatory takings, the former warrant the application of a categorical rule.'0 2
The Court emphasized that regulatory takings claims are usually determined on
an "ad hoc" basis because there is no "set formula" to determine whether a
regulatory taking took place.'0 3 Like the Ninth Circuit, the Court refused to
divide a fee simple interest into segments and hold that severance of only one
segment amounts to a taking."°
Next, the Supreme Court rejected petitioners' argument that First
English o5 provided the basis of a categorical rule for their temporary takings
claims.106 First English merely held that temporary takings must be compen-
sated, but had not decided the "logically prior question" whether a temporary
taking had in fact occurred.'0 7 Justice Stevens further noted that First English
specifically distinguished between normal and abnormal delays.' 0 8
Equally rejected was petitioners' claim that the categorical rule of Lucas
was determinative for the case at bar.' ° 9 The Court emphasized that the Lucas
analysis is to be reserved for the rare case where landowners are permanently
deprived of all economically beneficial use of their property; anything less than
a total deprivation is to be considered under a Penn Central analysis.'10 Not-
ing that petitioners had only been temporarily barred from constructing on their
property, Justice Stevens stated that petitioners erred by failing to challenge the
98 Id. at 1245.
99 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 774 (9th
Cir. 2000) (discussing that a property interest may include a physical dimension, a functional
dimension, and a temporal dimension).
1oo Id. at 777.
101 Id. at 778.
102 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-22
(2002).
103 Id. at 326.
'04 Id. at 331.
105 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
106 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 328-29.
107 Id. at 328.
108 Id. at 329.
1l9 Id.
1o Id. at 329-30.
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District Court's determination that no partial taking occurred under the Penn
Central analysis.11'
The Supreme Court then considered whether notions of "fairness and jus-
tice" could support the creation of a new rule.1 12 Specifically, it considered
seven scenarios that theoretically could warrant compensation.13 The Court
considered whether compensation should be due: (1) every time a government
regulation temporarily deprives landowners of all beneficial use of their prop-
erty; (2) every time landowners suffer more than a normal delay; (3) after a
certain fixed period of time; (4) every time "a series of rolling moratoria" starts
to resemble a permanent taking; (5) in case of 'bad faith' stalling on behalf of
the government; (6) in cases where the temporary measure does not advance a
legitimate state interest; and finally, (7) in cases where the regulation works a
taking in individual cases under the Penn Central framework.1 14
In refusing to adopt a new rule, the Supreme Court recognized that it is
difficult, if not arbitrary, to set specific time limits on moratoria because this
could frustrate the government's power to make thorough decisions.' 1 5 Fur-
thermore, adoption of a separate bad faith theory was not necessary: the Penn
Central framework could serve "fairness and justice concepts" just as well. 116
Persistently proclaiming that anything less than a total taking should be consid-
ered under the Penn Central analysis,1 17 the Court was apprehensive to formu-
late yet another exception that could cause a floodgate of litigation every time
there was some kind of delay.'1 8 However, the Supreme Court specifically
noted that the question of good faith on behalf of the government was one
factor to consider under the established Penn Central analysis." 9
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Lucas Redefined
Before Tahoe-Sierra, it was understood that the per se rule set forth in
Lucas could be used for cases in which owners are deprived of all beneficial
use of their property. Less clear was whether this per se rule could be applied
to cases in which owners are only temporarily deprived of all beneficial use of
their property.
The Tahoe petitioners argued that Lucas stood for temporary takings, and
that Lucas was decided on the basis of a temporary taking.120 Moreover, while
"I Id. at 321 n.16.
112 Id. at 332.
113 Id. at 333.
114 Id. at 333-35.
115 Id. at 334-35.
116 Id. at 335-38.
117 See, e.g., id. at 321 n.16, 325, 326, 330, 338 n.34, 342.
118 Id. at 331.
"' See id. at 338 (listing "good faith of the planners" as a separate factor next to "the
reasonable expectations of the landowners" and "the actual impact of the moratorium on
property values"); see also id. at 338 n.34 (concluding that the length of the delay is one of
several factors to consider under Penn Central).
120 See id. at 320-21.
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Lucas was prohibited from developing his land for two years,12 1 the Tahoe
petitioners had already been hindered in their development plans for nearly
three years. 12
2
The Tahoe-Sierra Court rejected petitioner's argument by noting that
Lucas was decided as if there were a permanent taking. 123 When Lucas filed
suit, the Beachfront Management Act was in full effect and appeared to be an
unconditional barrier for development.124 The fact that the Beachfront Man-
agement Act was amended to allow for exceptions pending the litigation did
not change that; originally, it looked like Lucas was permanently deprived of
all use of his property.' 25
Thus, the Tahoe-Sierra Court clarified that Lucas limits the application of
a per se rule to those deprivations meant to be permanent; the fact that the
regulation turns out to be temporary due to an amendment or retraction is irrel-
evant.126 Additionally, the Court refused to take into consideration the factual
resemblances between Lucas and Tahoe-Sierra in that both Lucas and the
Tahoe petitioners were deprived of all economically viable use of their land for
a number of years. The fact that petitioners' land development plans were
stalled eight months longer than Lucas did not matter. What mattered was the
permanent character of the Beachfront Management Act versus the temporary
nature of the Tahoe moratorium. 127 As Justice Blackmun would have said, the
Tahoe petitioners were not deprived of all beneficial use; they were still able to
barbeque, "picnic," or "camp in a tent" on their property.' 28
B. Bad Faith as an Extra Element in the Penn Central Analysis
The Tahoe-Sierra Court refused to adopt a new per se rule on the basis of
abnormal delays, 129 recognizing that it is difficult to determine the time at
which a delay becomes abnormal.13° Indeed, the amount of time the govern-
ment needs arguably depends on the circumstances and the reasons for which
regulations are enacted. In Tahoe-Sierra, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
faced a difficult and important environmental problem that could not be
decided in a matter of weeks. Depending on the significance of the matter,
governments may need less time. 13 1
While refusing to adopt a per se rule for abnormal delays, the Supreme
Court specifically mentioned the possibility of challenging the good faith of the
121 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992).
122 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
314 (2002).
123 Id. at 329-30.
124 See id; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012.
125 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 330.
126 See id. at 329-30; see also Robert H. Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Con-
demnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589, 595
(2002).
127 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 329-31.
128 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 332-34.
130 Id. at 334-35.
131 See Freilich, supra note 126, at 601 (discussing that the "reasonableness of a morato-
rium" depends on the "length of its duration" and the need for further studies and analysis).
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government under the Penn Central analysis. 132 To be sure, the Court empha-
sized that moratoria could, under certain circumstances, amount to a taking if
the government unnecessarily stalls in its decision-making process, thereby
causing unreasonable delays.' 3 3 It specifically listed "good faith" next to "rea-
sonable expectations of the landowners" and "actual impact of the moratorium
on property values." 134 Finally, it concluded that "the Penn Central framework
adequately directs the inquiry to the proper considerations - only one of which
is the length of the delay."'
135
"Bad faith delay" is not a new concept in Takings jurisprudence. In First
English, the Supreme Court indicated that extraordinary delays could amount
to temporary takings. 136 In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 3 the good faith of the city was challenged under the Takings Clause
when the city systematically denied granting building permits, each time
imposing harsher demands on the developer. 1 38 Lower courts, too, had already
tested the good faith of local governments under the Takings Clause. 1 39 How-
ever, Tahoe-Sierra was the first time that the Supreme Court addressed bad
faith stalling under the umbrella of the Penn Central factors. 4 o
The Tahoe-Sierra Court did not discuss whether the Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency had acted in bad faith because the district court had already deter-
mined that there was no bad faith stalling on the government's behalf. 14 1
Moreover, the Tahoe petitioners had not challenged the district court's determi-
nation that petitioners suffered no taking under the Penn Central test. 142 How-
ever, the Supreme Court hinted that the two moratoria in question were normal
delays: it noted that such moratoria "are used widely among land use planners,"
thereby implying a justification for the delay. 14 3
C. First English Redefined
Before Tahoe-Sierra, a number of courts understood First English to
mean that there is no difference between permanent and temporary takings:
132 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 338 n.34.
133 Id. at 333.
134 Id. at 338.
135 Id. at 338 n.34.
136 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 320
(1987).
137 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
138 Id. at 695-697.
131 See, e.g., Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156, 163 n.11 (1990) (discussing that land-
owners bear the burden of proving that the government acted in bad faith); Smereka v. Haid,
No. 97-CV-70151-DT, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13356, at *5, 6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1999)
(holding that if the government is actively deliberating on a land proposal and there is no bad
faith, "the delay is not extraordinary").
140 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
338 (2002); First Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 304.
' Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 334.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 337.
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both need to be treated alike, and both require compensation."'4 To be sure, the
First English Court specifically noted that temporary takings "are not different
in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires
compensation." 14
5
The Tahoe-Sierra Court, however, stressed that First English only
addressed whether compensation was due if a temporary taking had occurred;
not whether in fact a temporary taking had occurred.' 4 6 Thus, while not
rejecting the argument that temporary takings require compensation, the Court
rejected the argument that First English stood for the application of a per se
rule to a temporary takings claim. 14 7
The interpretation of First English given by the Tahoe-Sierra Court is
disputed.14 8 If the focus of First English was solely the compensation issue,
why did the Court elaborate on the similarity between permanent and tempo-
rary takings?149 Why did the Court distinguish between normal delays and
extraordinary delays? 150 Arguably, the First English Court was well aware
that it was deciding a case involving a temporary, not a permanent measure. 5 1
As one commentator noted, "the temporary use prohibition was always
intended to be of finite duration ... it would seem inescapable that the Court
intended its decision to apply to planning moratoria that were designed to be in
effect for only a limited period of time." '152
Regardless of how First English could be interpreted, the Tahoe-Sierra
Court closed the door to attack temporary regulations under the categorical
Lucas rule. 153 It thus refused to recognize the fact that, from the landowner's
perspective, there is no difference between a permanent taking that becomes
temporary as a result of a change or retraction of the law, and a "real" tempo-
"4 See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1097 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tabb Lakes,
Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 829
P.2d 765, 774 (Wash. 1992).
14" First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987).
146 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 328.
147 Id. at 329.
148 Compare TAKING SIES, supra note 43, § 11.1, at 274-77 (defending that First English
decided more than just the remedy question, and specifically noting that temporary takings
are not different from permanent ones), with Carla Boyd, Comment, Temporal Severance
and the Exclusion of Time in Determining the Economic Value of Regulated Property, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 793, 820 (2002) (arguing that the holding in First English was limited to the
remedy issue).
149 See J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council and Its Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,
24, 54 (2002) (stating that the language of First English implied there was no difference
between permanent and temporary restrictions).
'50 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 11.1, at 275.
151 Id. at 274; but see Boyd, supra note 148, at 820 (arguing that First English concerned a
regulation intended to be permanent).
152 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 11.1, at 274-75.
"I Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342
(2002) (noting that "per se rules" should be resisted).
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rary taking as a result of an interim measure that is in effect for the same
amount of time or longer. 154
D. Permanent, Semi-Permanent, and Temporary Takings
When the Tahoe-Sierra Court's analysis of Lucas and First English is
combined, three categories of regulations are revealed, each warranting sepa-
rate taking rules. First, there is the "unconditional and permanent" government
regulation that permanently deprives landowners of all beneficial use of their
property.1 55 In this case, landowners can claim a permanent taking under the
categorical Lucas rule.1 5
6
Second is the category encompassing "semi-permanent" regulations.
Here, a regulation initially deprives owners of all beneficial use of their prop-
erty, but this regulation is later amended or rescinded. During the time the
regulation is in effect, the deprivation is permanent and only becomes tempo-
rary when the regulation is no longer in effect.' 57 In this case, landowners can
claim a "semi-permanent" taking under the per se Lucas rule for the time the
regulation was in effect and appeared to have a permanent character. 158
Third, there is the "true" temporary regulation, where a more-than-normal
delay in the governmental decision-making process temporarily deprives the
landowner of all beneficial use of property. 159 Landowners who claim they
have suffered a temporary taking must proceed under the Penn Central
framework. 160
These three categories raise two central questions. The first question is
whether the distinction between the second category (semi-permanent regula-
tions) and the third category (temporary regulations) justifies a separate Taking
analysis. The second question is whether the Penn Central framework ade-
quately protects landowners who claim a temporary taking.
E. Does the Distinction Between Semi-Permanent and Temporary
Regulations Justify a Separate Takings Rule?
1. There Is a Difference Between Semi-Permanent and Temporary
Regulations
Those who contend there is a difference between semi-permanent and
temporary regulations offer several arguments. The first argument is simply
that landowners claiming a temporary taking only suffer a temporary depriva-
154 Compare Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010-11 (1992) (discussing the
amendment of the Beachfront Management Act), with Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535
U.S. at 306-12 (discussing the two moratoria).
155 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 329.
156 See id.
157 Id. at 330 (discussing that Lucas had been decided on a permanent taking theory despite
the fact that the Beachfront Management Act was later amended to allow for exceptions).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 332, 341-42.
160 Id. at 342.
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tion. 16 ' When looking at the property as a whole, only a temporal slice of the
bundle of rights has been taken. 16 2 While landowners are deprived of the cur-
rent use of their land, they still have the prospect of "future use."' 16 3 Landown-
ers faced with semi-permanent regulations, by contrast, do not have the
prospect of ever being able to develop their land. 16" "Any future use" is merely
"speculative."' 165
The second argument is that, in the case of temporary regulations, land-
owners retain more value in their land than landowners who face a "semi-per-
manent" regulation.1 66 As the Tahoe-Sierra Court stated, "the property will
recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted."'16 7 In fact, the value of prop-
erty is likely to increase during the moratorium as this moratorium preserves
Lake Tahoe's "pristine state." 16' Regulations meant to permanently ban land
development, on the other hand, will severely affect the market value of the
land, since few or no buyers would be interested in investing in land that is un-
developable. 169
A third argument is that "government hardly could go on" if it had to
compensate landowners every time they have to wait for a building permit or a
change in zoning.'17  Moreover, it would be difficult to assess the damages to
be awarded for a temporary deprivation. 17' Landowners who are permanently
deprived of all land use receive the fair market value of their land.1 7 2 Land-
owners who are only temporarily deprived from using their land may receive
the rental value of their land. 173 If, as the Tahoe-Sierra Court noted, the prop-
erty value recovers or increases after the moratorium is lifted,'17 landowners
who claimed they suffered a temporary taking appear to have received a
windfall.
In sum, the temporary nature of the regulation, the remaining value of the
property during the moratorium, the burden on the government if it had to com-
pensate all extraordinary delays, and the difficulty in assessing damages make
temporary and semi-permanent regulations distinguishable.
161 See, e.g., Tedra Fox, Lake Tahoe's Temporary Development Moratorium: Why a Stitch
in Time Should Not Define the Property Interest in a Takings Claim, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 399,
418 (2001).
162 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 331.
163 See Fox, supra note 161, at 418.
164 Id.; see also Boyd, supra note 148, at 820-21 (2002) (arguing that, in case of a tempo-
rary moratorium, any impact on the value of land is merely temporary).
165 Fox, supra note 161, at 418.
166 See id.
167 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 332.
168 Id. at 341.
169 See Fox, supra note 161, at 418.
170 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 335 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
171 See David Schultz, The Price Is Right! Property Valuation for Temporary Takings, 22
HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 299-301 (1998) (discussing various methods of valuation, and con-
cluding that damages for temporary takings are especially difficult to calculate).
172 Id. at 300.
173 Id.
17" See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 332.
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2. There Is No Difference Between Temporary and Semi-Permanent
Regulations
A number of arguments have been set forth to defend the notion that there
is no difference between temporary and semi-permanent regulations. First, as
the dissenters noted in Tahoe-Sierra, the temporary nature of the regulation
does not console landowners, as "in the long run, we are all dead."1 7 5 In other
words, the amount of time a landowner is deprived of all beneficial use of his
property does and should matter; not just the temporary nature of the regula-
tion. Although there is a theoretical distinction between the semi-permanent
regulation in Lucas and the temporary moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra, function-
ally this does not make a difference from the landowner's perspective.1 76 The
fact remains that the temporary moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra has already lasted
longer than the semi-permanent regulation in Lucas.177 Logically, it does not
make sense that the Tahoe petitioners do not receive compensation after two
years and eight months, while Lucas was compensated for a semi-permanent
regulation that lasted only two years. 178
A second argument is that there is no real distinction between permanent
and temporary regulations, since no regulations are ever truly permanent: the
very nature of regulations is that they can be amended or retracted. 179 This is
exactly what happened in Lucas. The Beachfront Management Act that perma-
nently banned development was amended two years later to allow for
exceptions. 180
Third, as Justice Brennan suggested, the Constitution does not differenti-
ate between permanent and temporary takings.' 81 The Fifth Amendment
requires compensation "[a]s soon as property has been taken, whether through
formal condemnation proceedings, occupancy, physical invasion, or regula-
tion. '  The only difference between a temporary and a permanent taking
should be the amount of compensation that is due.
18 3
Fourth, while it is true that "government hardly could go on" if it had to
compensate all landowners who claim a temporary taking, there is a danger that
government will simply circumvent its obligation to compensate property own-
ers by classifying all prohibitions on development as "temporary" measure-
ments. 184 It is possible that, in some cases, government has already decided to
refrain from developing property, but does not like the idea of compensating
hundreds of landowners. 
85
175 Id. at 356 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
176 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 11.4, at 289.
177 See Breemer, supra note 149, at 51.
178 Id.
179 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 11.3, at 285 (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
8 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010-11 (1992).
"I' San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653, 655 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
182 Id. at 654.
183 See id. at 658-59; see also TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 11.3, at 284-85.
184 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
347 (Rehnquist, Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
185 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 11.4(a), at 290.
[Vol. 4:448
CAMPING IN LAKE TAHOE
Finally, although it is difficult to determine how much to award landown-
ers who claim a temporary taking, it is fair to compensate landowners for the
time they are deprived of "all economically beneficial or productive use of their
land."' 86 To be sure, it is doubtful that the Tahoe petitioners - especially those
who intended to build a retirement home - consider camping and barbequing to
be a "beneficial and productive use" of their land.187 If landowners receive the
rental value of their property for the time the regulation was in effect, 188 at least
they could temporarily vacation or retire elsewhere. At the same time, Lake
Tahoe tourists and the public at large would bear the burden of keeping the
Lake Tahoe water clear, leading to the "reciprocity of advantage" of the
moratorium. 189
F. Does the Penn Central Analysis Protect Landowners Who Claim a
Temporary Taking?
1. The Penn Central Analysis Adequately Protects Landowners Who
Claim a Temporary Taking
Arguably, the Penn Central framework offers sufficient protection for
landowners who claim to have suffered a temporary taking, especially since the
Tahoe-Sierra Court noted that landowners could challenge bad faith delays
under this analysis.19° While the district court did not find a temporary taking
under the Penn Central analysis,19' in different circumstances a taking may be
found.
In Tahoe-Sierra, the first Penn Central factor - the economic impact of
the regulation on the landowner - was not met: the value of the land did not
diminish during the two years that the moratorium was in effect. 192 However,
it is likely that the value of land will decrease the longer the delay lasts. Inves-
tors will become less motivated to take a risk to invest in land that cannot be
developed for a considerable amount of time. Landowners will, of course, have
to prove that the change in value to their land was the direct result of the gov-
ernment measure or lack thereof, and not caused by economic factors1 93 that
independently affect the market price.
The second Penn Central factor examines reasonable investment-backed
expectations. 194 In Tahoe-Sierra, the district court found it especially relevant
that the average holding time between the time landowners bought their prop-
erty and the time they could develop it was twenty-five years. 195 The district
court could not consider the investment-backed expectations of the petitioners
186 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
187 Cf. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Petitioner can picnic, swim,
camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable trailer.").
188 See Schultz, supra note 171, at 300.
189 Cf. id. at 341 (contending that the moratorium benefits petitioners).
190 Id. at 338.
'91 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d.
1226, 1240 (D. Nev. 1999).
192 Id. at 1242-43.
193 Such as an overall pessimistic market for land or a sharp increase in interest rates.
194 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
195 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-41.
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individually, because no argument was made to counter the average holding
time.' 96 Landowners who reasonably expected to be able to develop their land
sooner should voice this and attack temporary regulations under this factor.' 97
Moreover, landowners who had notice of a development ban at the time of
purchase are not precluded from advancing a takings argument.' 98 However,
landowners must be careful not to postpone their plans to develop their prop-
erty. In Dodd v. Hood River County,199 buyers could not claim a taking
because, after buying the land, they waited six years before applying for a
building permit. 2°° The Ninth Circuit held that the landowners therefore did
not have reasonable investment-backed expectations.2 '
The Tahoe-Sierra Court seems to have given new meaning to the last
Penn Central factor - the character of the government action. The Court
repeatedly stressed that bad faith stalling by the government was one factor to
consider under the Penn Central analysis.20 2 "Bad faith" fits within the last
Penn Central factor: when courts determine whether a government agency
unjustifiably stalls in making a decision, courts look at the nature of the govern-
ment action in determining the legitimacy of the delay.2 °3
For example, in Mitchell v. Kemp,204 the court found an unreasonable
delay in taking the Town five years to enact a zoning ordinance.20 5 The court
held that, while interim legislation is proper during the preparation of a com-
prehensive zoning ordinance, the life of such legislation must not be unlim-
ited. 2 6 Because the Town did not offer any reasons for the delay, the court
held that the delay was arbitrary and capricious. 207
Consequently, if the temporary regulation has a significant impact on the
value of the land, 08 if landowners do not wait to apply for building permits
when they buy their land, and if the government is unable to justify the delay
for the specific regulation or lack thereof, landowners may be able to success-
fully attack temporary measures under the Penn Central framework.
196 Id. at 1241.
'9' See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
334 (2002) (pointing to the failure of petitioners to challenge the district court's findings
under the Penn Central analysis).
198 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001).
'99 136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998).
200 Id. at 1230.
201 Id.
202 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 336, 337, 338 n.34.
203 See generally Freilich, supra note 126, at 601 (discussing that "the reasonableness of a
moratorium" depends on the need for "studies, analysis, public participation, and the drafting
of the legislation").
204 575 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1991).
205 Id. at 338.
206 See id.
207 Id.
208 See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) ("Mere fluctuations in value during
the process of governmental decisionmaking ... are incidents of ownership.").
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2. The Penn Central Analysis Does Not Adequately Protect
Landowners Who Claim a Temporary Taking
Despite the addition of the "bad faith" factor to the Penn Central frame-
work,2 °9 there are several arguments that the Penn Central test does not ade-
quately protect landowners who claim a temporary taking. First, it has been
argued that two, if not all three, Penn Central factors are too vague to give
courts the necessary guidance as to how to apply them.21 ° Specifically, the
"investment-backed expectations" factor has been given several inconsistent
meanings over the years. 2 1 1 At first, landowners could not have reasonable
investment-backed expectations if they had notice of a government regulation
that limited or banned development on their property.21 2 Then, in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,21 3 the Supreme Court held that notice of a moratorium does not
foreclose the finding of a temporary taking.214 However, even if notice of the
regulation is not determinative, the question remains: under what circumstances
are investment-backed expectations unreasonable? 215  Indeed, without more
specific guidelines from the Supreme Court, there is a danger that investment-
backed expectations are unreasonable whenever the reviewing court thinks they
are.
2 16
The "character of the government action" factor is equally "opaque and
confusing. ' 217 The Penn Central Court suggested that the character of the gov-
ernment action depends on whether the government physically takes property
or regulates the use of property.21 8 However, if all physical appropriations by
the government are considered per se takings, what meaning does this factor
still have after Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. ?219 According
to some commentators, the "character" factor refers to whether there is a justifi-
cation for the regulation, or whether the regulation benefits the public.
220
However, the legitimacy of a regulation does not preclude a taking:22 1 a regula-
209 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
320-21 (2002).
210 See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 49, § 220, at 39 (1997) (noting that the Supreme
Court has not given lower courts guidance as to how to apply the "reasonable investment-
backed expectations" factor); TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 9.2, at 226-30 (relating the
lack of clarity on how to interpret the Penn Central test); see also Note, Leading Cases: L
Constitutional Law: H. Takings Clause, 116 HARV. L. REv. 321, 329 (2002) [hereinafter
Leading Cases] (noting the vagueness of the Penn Central factors).
211 Compare Ruckelshaus v. Montesanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984) (holding that
notice of the regulation precludes reasonable investment-backed expectations), with Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (holding that notice of the regulation does
not preclude a takings claim).
212 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1006; Leonard. v. Town of Brimfield, 423 Mass.
152, 155 (1996).
213 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
214 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
215 See Leading Cases, supra note 210, at 329.
216 Id.
217 TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 9.3 (a), at 231.
218 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
219 458 U.S. 419 (1982; See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 9.3 (a), at 231.
220 See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in America's Industrial States after Lucas,
24 TOL. L. REv. 281, 296 (1993).
221 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 11.4 (c), at 294-95.
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tion deemed beneficial to the public may nevertheless necessitate compensation
under the Takings Clause.2"'
Moreover, attacking temporary regulations on the basis of "bad faith stall-
ing" is difficult, because it is typically the landowner who has the burden to
prove that the government acted in bad faith.2 23 Because "courts give extreme
deference" to temporary regulations, 24 it is very difficult to overcome the pre-
sumption that the government acted in good faith.
225
If two of the three Penn Central factors are unworkable, the risk is that too
much emphasis will be put on the last factor - the impact of the regulation on
the landowner. Not only will it be difficult to prove that a regulation has a
significant impact on the value of property during a moratorium,226 the impact
of a temporary regulation on value is not necessarily the primary concern of
landowners. Unless landowners buy land solely for investment purposes, it is
what they temporarily cannot do with their land that matters to most landown-
ers. As Justice Brennan noted, from the perspective of a landowner, a taking is
not determined "by what a state says, or by what it intends, but by what it
does .,227 This was especially true for a number of Tahoe petitioners. The mor-
atorium hindered them from building a retirement or vacation home on their
Lake Tahoe land.22 8
Thus, unless the Supreme Court gives lower courts more specific direction
on interpreting the three Penn Central factors and how much weight each fac-
tor is to be accorded, the Penn Central test fails to be an adequate test, and
especially fails to meet the needs of the landowners.
G. No Clear Answers - Just Important Questions
All arguments considered, and as frustrating as this may be, there are no
clear answers to the difficult question of what to do with temporary takings. As
this discussion has demonstrated, there are valid arguments on both sides.22 9
On one hand, there may be too much emphasis on the legal distinction
between temporary, semi-permanent, and permanent regulations. Maybe courts
222 See Ruckelshaus v. Montesanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004-05 (1984); Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a regulation can effect a taking despite its legitimate
purpose).
223 See Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156, 164 (1990) (stating that government acts are
awarded a presumption of good faith); MANDELKER, supra note 49, § 2.37, at 53; see also
Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701, 704-05 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (stressing that,
without a showing of bad faith, a temporary moratorium that is in effect for a period of time
is not unreasonable as a matter of law).
224 See MANDELKER, supra note 49, § 2.37, at 53.
225 See, e.g., Dufau, 22 Cl. Ct. at 164 (finding no support for the assertion that the Army
Corps of Engineers had acted in bad faith); Smereka v. Haid, No. 97-CV-70151-DT, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13356, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1999) (finding that appellant failed to
make a showing that the delay was unreasonable).
226 See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) ("Mere fluctuations in value during
the process of governmental decision making ... are incidents of ownership.").
227 San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652-53 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
228 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
312-13 (2002).
229 See discussion supra Parts IV.E-F.
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are failing to look at the effect of the regulation from the landowners' perspec-
tive.23 ° Instinctively, it seems arbitrary to distinguish between regulations that
temporarily deprive landowners of all use of their property, and "permanent"
regulations that are subsequently amended or rescinded. To be sure, the dis-
tinction does not have any significance to landowners: in both cases, landown-
ers temporarily miss the ability to make productive use of their land.23 1
On the other hand, it seems unthinkable to require that the government -
the tax payers - compensate landowners every time there is a more-than-nor-
mal delay that temporarily deprives landowners of all use of their property.
232
Where draw the line? At one year? Sixteen months? Moreover, how much
compensation is due? How do we avoid windfalls or unfair losses? 233
Although the Supreme Court held that compensation is due if landowners
are forced "to bear public burdens which in all fairness and justice should be
borne by the public as a whole, ' 2 34 the factors given by the Penn Central Court
fail to give lower courts guidance.235 Maybe, in "all fairness and justice," the
Supreme Court ought to reconsider its Takings jurisprudence, develop factors
that recognize the needs of both the government and the landowners, and make
an effort to truly define each determinative factor so that lower courts have
guidance in considering temporary takings claims.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tahoe-Sierra Court faced the difficult question of whether a morato-
rium, temporarily depriving landowners of all use of their property, effected a
taking under the categorical Lucas rule. The Court held that it did not, and
clarified that the Lucas analysis is to be reserved for the rare cases where regu-
lations are intended to permanently deprive owners of all economically viable
use of their property. 36 In all other cases, the Penn Central analysis
applies.2 37 However, the Court specifically noted that bad faith stalling by the
government had a place in this analysis. 238 The Court's holding therefore does
not foreclose the possibility that temporary regulations may amount to
takings.23 9
The question is whether the difference between temporary regulations and
"permanent" regulations that are later altered or rescinded warrants a different
takings analysis. Moreover, assuming the distinction is valid, the question
remains whether the Penn Central test effectively protects landowners who
wish to claim a temporary taking.
230 See TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 11.4, at 289.
231 See discussion supra Part IV.E.2.
232 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 335.
233 See discussion supra Part IV.E.1.
234 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
235 TAKING SIDES, supra note 43, § 9.2, at 226-30.
236 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
237 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 337-38.
238 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
239 Id.
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While there are valid arguments on both sides, 240 the fact remains that if
the Supreme Court wants courts to use the Penn Central factors, it needs to
clarify and define all factors so as to give courts guidance on how to approach
temporary takings claims. Specifically, in defining all of the important factors,
the Court ought to recognize the needs of both the government and the land-
owners, so that the burden will truly be borne by those who, in all fairness and
justice, deserve to bear it.
240 See discussion supra Parts V.E-F.
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